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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
seems, to. the writer, to be the more logical common law interpretation of the
rule. Obtaining money under false pretenses is, in all of our jurisdictions, a
complete and distinct offense; the policy of some of our courts in construing
such an offense to be forgery appears to be a usurpation of authority by the
courts and an undue infringement on the law-making body of the state.
W. G. S., '28.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PREsENTATION OF NoncE AS CONDITION PRECEDENT
TO REcovERY.-Plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger for hire in a
bus owned and operated by a municipal corporation. Charter provided that no
action for personal injuries could be maintained against the city unless notice
was given in writing to the city clerk within fifteen days of the occurrence of
the injury. Plaintiff failed to file such notice. Held, that charter provision ap-
plies only when the municipality is charged by law with some corporate duty,
and is exercising functions of that character when the injury occurs, and does
not apply when it is engaged in an ordinary private business for hire. Borski
v. City of Wakefield, 215 N. W. 19, (Mich. 1927).
Notice of claim is not a prerequisite in the absence of a statutory provision.
Globe v. Rabogliatti, 24 Ariz. 392, 210 Pac. 685, 19 R. C. L. 1040, and cases there
cited. The language of such provisions must always be noted carefully, for they
differ widely in the various states and hence a number of cases are decided
solely on the particular language of the statute. Provisions requiring notice
are in derogation of the common law, and should be construed with reasonable
strictness. Cawthom v. Houston, 231 S. W. 701 (Tex.); San Antonio v. Pfeif-
fer, 216 S. W. 207 (Tex. Civ. App.) ; Tattan v. Detroit, 128 Mich. 650, 87 N. W.
894.
Where the statute makes no exception in favor of persons physically or men-
tally incapable of giving notice during the statutory period, the weight of au-
thority holds that the court cannot supply it. Ransom v. South Bend, 76 Wash.
396, 136 Pac. 365; Touhey v. Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540, 32 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 350; Schmidt v. Fremont, 70 Neb. 577, 97 N. W. 830. A contrary rule
is followed in Born v. Spokane, 27 Wash. 719, 68 Pac. 386, and Webster v.
Beaver Dam, 84 Fed. 280, on the ground that the law does not seek to compel
a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. In general, infancy does
not excuse failure to comply with the statutory requirement. Baker v. Mani-
tou, 277 Fed. 232; Dechant v. Hays, 112 Kans. 729, 212 Pac. 682; Hurley v.
Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213. It has been held that the requirement of
notice was not intended to apply to the relations between a municipal corpora-
tion and its employees, when the latter are injured by reason of a failure of
the former to provide a safe place to work. Gaughan v. St. Paul, 119 Minn.
63, 137 N. W. 199; Giuricevic v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 329, 106 Pac. 908. The rea-
son given is that it must be presumed that the city had notice of the injury of
its servant. A contrary result is reached in Condon v. Chicago, 249 Ill. 596, 94
N. E. 976. It is well established that actual knowledge by the municipality
does not excuse failure to present notice. See for example, Reid v. Kansas
City, 195 Mo. App. 457, 192 S. W. 1047; Touhey v. Decatur, supra. It is gen-
erally held that want of notice may not be waived by municipal authorities.
Touhey v. Decatur, supra; Dechant v. Hays, supra; Walters v. Ottawa, 240 Ill.
259, 88 N. E. 651, and cases therein cited. In Cawthom v. Houston, supra, it
was held that the city may waive the charter requirement or may be estopped by
the conduct of its officers from requiring a strict compliance when the city is
acting in a private as contradistinguished from a governmental capacity.
In the principal case, the statute did not make any distinction between govern-
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mental and business functions, but the court implies one, and quoting Andrews
v. South Haven, 187 Mich. 29, 153 N. W. 827, "In exercising its business powers,
a city is governed by the same rules which control a private individual or busi-
ness corporation under like circumstances." The court further says that inas-
much as the city voluntarily goes into the same business as private citizens,
there is no good reason why it should be given special privileges not enjoyed
by others who are compelled to meet its competition. Cases in accord with the
principal case are: Henry v. Lincoln, 93 Nebr. 331, 140 N. W. 664, 50 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 174; D'Amico v. Boston, 176 Mass. 599, 58 N. E. 158; Cook v. Beatrice,
207 N. W. 518 (Nebr. 1926).
A contrary view is expressed in Dickie v. Centralia, 91 Wash. 467, 157 Pac.
1084; Western Salt Co. v. San Diego, 181 Cal. 696, 186 Pac. 345; O'Neil v.
Richmond, 141 Va. 168, 126 S. E. 56; Shear v. Everett, 134 Wash. 389, 235 Pac.
789; Frasch v. New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. W. 121.
It is submitted that the principal case is wrongly decided. Perhaps the ends
of justice were served, but the court by judicial legislation, flies in the teeth of
the express words of the statute. The purpose of the statute requiring notice
is to advise the city in what its alleged negligence exists, and to afford it an
opportunity at an early date to investigate the nature and cause of the injury
while the conditions remain substantially the same. Canon City v. Cox, 133
Pac. 1040 (Colo.) And it is as important that the city have notice of a claim
for injury caused by it while acting in a business capacity as when it acts in a
governmental capacity. Frasch v. New Ulm, supra. The fact that the city
and private corporations have similar liabilities does not preclude the legislature
from making distinctions between them in respect to conditions precedent to
suit. More and more cities are buying and managing public utilities; such
action is deemed beneficial and convenient to its inhabitants. Every reason
which calls for the service of a written notice of claim upon a municipality be-
fore suit in any case where it acts in a governmental capacity applies in this case.
The funds of a city pay both types of claims. J. N., '29.
NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE AS NEGLIGENCE PER S.-The plaintiff
was struck by a street car of the defendant, driven at the time at a speed
greater than that allowed by a city ordinance. Held, that that violation of the
ordinance constituted negligence per se. Unterlachner v. Wells, 296 S. W. 755
(Mo., 1927).
There is a division of authority on this question. Some courts hold
that the violation of an ordinance is not of itself negligence, but merely
evidence from which the jury may infer negligence, taking into consideration
other facts of the case. This is the rule in Massachusetts, Harlan v. Railway
Co., 129 Mass. 310; Michigan, Rotter v. Detroit U. R. Co., 171 N. W. 514; New
York, McGrath v. N. Y. C., 63 N. Y. 52; and Ohio, Meek v. Penna. Ry. Co., 38
Ohio St. 632.
The reasoning in such cases is that the ordinance is merely a police regulation
subjecting the violator to penalties, and that it cannot serve to create a liability
where none existed before. To hold violation to be negligence in itself is to
perfmit the city council to legislate concerning civil liability, a matter outside of
its power and intention. But the courts do hold that the violation characterizes
the conduct of the defendant, and is therefore evidence of his lack of care.
The other view, that the violation is negligence per se, is followed principally
in Alabama, S. & N. Ala. R. Co. v. Donovan, 84 Ala. 141; Georgia, Cent. R. Co.
v. Tribble, 112 Ga. 863; Indiana, Union Traction Co. v. Wynkoop, 154 N. E. 40;
and in Texas, Tex. etc. R. Co. v. Ball, 85 S. W. 456. The theory underlying this
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